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Abstract 
DisĐussioŶ of a ͚dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt͛ eŵeƌged as teĐhŶologiĐal adǀaŶĐes left pƌofessioŶals ĐoŶsideƌiŶg 
getting back in touch with patients they had seen in the past. While there has been much discussion 
of the duty to recontact as a matter of theory and ethics, there has been rather little empirically 
ďased aŶalǇsis of ǁhat this ͚dutǇ͛ ĐoŶsists of. DƌaǁiŶg oŶ iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁith ϯϭ pƌofessioŶals ǁoƌkiŶg 
iŶ, oƌ ĐloselǇ ǁith, geŶetiĐs seƌǀiĐes, this papeƌ eǆploƌes ǁhat the ͚dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt͛ ŵeaŶs foƌ 
healthcare professionals involved in genetics. Using a discourse analytic framework, the paper 
identifies three system generated discourses on recontact (governance, legal and responsibilising 
discourses) and three lifeworld discourses (situating recontact as a formal duty; more loosely as an 
oďligatioŶ; aŶd as a peƌsoŶal seŶse of ƌespoŶsiďilitǇͿ. IŶ suŵŵaƌǇ, the papeƌ shoǁs that the ͚dutǇ͛ to 
recontact involves a complex interplay of system responsibilities with professional duties, 
responsibilities and obligations. 
Keywords: duty to recontact, professional responsibilities, system and lifeworld, discourses of 
responsibility  
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 Introduction 
Developments in genetic technologies have raised the question of whether and when patients 
should be recontacted to give them an updated interpretation of their genetic test results at least 
since Pelias raised this question in 1991 (e.g. Pelias, 1991). However, the combination of new 
genomic technologies and advances in the understanding of genes and disease increases pressure to 
ĐlaƌifǇ the Ŷatuƌe of this ͚dutǇ͛ aŶd to pƌoǀide pƌofessioŶals ǁith adǀiĐe aŶd guidaŶĐe (Pyeritz, 2011).  
A variety of issues may drive professionals to recontact patients. Genomic technologies produce far 
ŵoƌe data aďout aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s geŶetiĐ ŵake-up than is needed to answer specific health related 
ƋuestioŶs. “oŵe of this data ŵaǇ ͞ďe ƌeleǀaŶt to the patieŶt͛s futuƌe well-ďeiŶg͟ aŶd thus ͞ƌaises 
poteŶtial diffiĐulties͟ (Clarke, 2014: 18). Many patients who had tests in the past may be offered an 
improved test. In addition, interpretations of the role of particular genes in clinical diagnosis or 
prediction also evolve over time. The accumulation of information on genetic variants allows 
researchers to classify, and reclassify, variants in terms of their pathogenicity (Timmermans et al., 
2016), which may prompt clinicians to reconsider past cases. Advances in knowledge of the genetic 
component of a disease can reveal genetic diagnoses in previously undiagnosed patients (Zhu et al., 
2015). Finally, new information on how a condition can be managed, or new therapeutic 
interventions, might provide clinicians with reasons to want to recontact some patients.  
These developments raise issues regarding the nature of the duty to recontact and the incorporation 
of that duty into professional practice and organisational structure. Responses to this incorporation 
have, thus far, been guarded. Legal and ethical analysts have problematised the nature and scope of 
such a duty (Hunter et al., 2001). Drawing on qualitative work with clinicians, (Fitzpatrick et al., 1999: 
852) suggest that ͞ƌeĐoŶtaĐtiŶg patieŶts [is] aŶ ethiĐallǇ desiƌaďle, ďut Ŷot feasiďle, goal͟. AppealiŶg 
to the Ŷeed foƌ poliĐǇ guidaŶĐe aŶd iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe to suppoƌt a ͚dutǇ͛ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt, PǇeƌitz ;ϮϬϭϭͿ 
ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded that ͞ĐliŶiĐiaŶs should aĐĐept ǁith ĐautioŶ aŶ eǆpliĐit dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt͟. IŶ effeĐt, 
developments in technological and research discourses that suggest a need to recontact should not 
translate directly into the incorporation of a duty to recontact for clinicians. In their review of the 
literature, Otten et al. (2015) highlighted the array of potential combinations of ethical, legal and 
soĐial issues that ŵaǇ justifǇ ƌeĐoŶtaĐtiŶg iŶ diffeƌeŶt ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes, aŶd ĐoŶĐlude that ͞[a] geŶeƌal 
dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt iŶ ĐliŶiĐal geŶetiĐs ǁill theƌefoƌe Ŷot ďe appliĐaďle͟ ;ϮϬϭϱ: ϲϳϳͿ. Neǀeƌtheless, 
Otten el al. (2015) express support for expanding the scope of professional judgement when they 
aƌgue foƌ ͞foĐusiŶg oŶ the ƋuestioŶ of iŶ ǁhiĐh speĐifiĐ situatioŶs ƌeĐoŶtaĐtiŶg ŵight ďe ƌegaƌded as 
a good staŶdaƌd of Đaƌe͟ ;ϮϬϭϱ: ϲϳϳͿ. Ouƌ oǁŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs haǀe used suƌǀeǇ data to reveal the ad 
hoc way in which genetic services recontact patients (Carrieri et al., 2016), and the perception that 
practical barriers impede the goal of recontacting these patients (Carrieri et al., 2017b). We have 
also shown that there is some support among patients for a joint venture model of recontacting, 
raising the possibility that the duty to recontact may be shared between professionals and patients 
(Dheensa et al., 2017). Overall, while there is widespread agreement that it is right to recontact 
patients when relevant new information comes to light, there is little consensus on how this value 
should be implemented and how a duty to recontact could become part of normal care (Carrieri et 
al., 2017a).  
Little empirical evidence has been gathered on professional views on recontacting (Carrieri et al., 
2017b; Fitzpatrick et al., 1999). This paper provides some redress for this gap using qualitative data 
from interviews conducted with professionals involved in medical genetics. Our aim is to explore 
how genetic professionals incorporate the duty to recontact into their existing practice. To achieve 
this, we use a nuanced discourse analytic frame drawing on both Foucault and Habermas, which we 
use to distinguish aspects of responsibility. Our aim is to identify the discourses with which genetic 
professionals make sense of the duty to recontact. In doing so, we reveal that there is no simple 
͚dutǇ͛ ďut iŶstead a Đoŵpleǆ iŶteƌplaǇ of sǇsteŵ ƌespoŶsiďilities as ǁell as pƌofessioŶal duties, 
responsibilities and obligations. The paper is structured around two main sections. In the first, we 
develop a frame for our empirical analysis based around systemic and constructionist views of 
responsibility. The second section applies this frame to our empirical data to provide an analysis of 
hoǁ geŶetiĐ pƌofessioŶals ŵake seŶse of the ͚dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt͛.  
Ethics, geŶetics aŶd the ͚dutǇ͛ to recoŶtact 
Recontacting raises the seemingly simple question of whether to get back in touch with a patient 
with new information after a lapse of time. As we outlined above, this question can arise in a variety 
of scenarios. But over and above these, recontacting raises issues of rationing, efficiency, ethics and 
professionalism in genetics.  
As is well documented, the scientific treatment of genetics has seen a shift from a science that 
focuses on deciphering genes and identifying the genetic cause of conditions, to sequencing 
genomes and managing complex data (Via et al., 2010). Accompanying this transformation is a shift 
from a genetic reductionism and determinism focusing on single genes as direct causes of specific 
conditions, to a pragmatic reductionism that focuses on collecting and managing vast databases 
(Zwart, 2007). While genomic medicine raises the possibility of providing patients with a more 
personalised medicine (Harvey, 2009) it also raises the prospect of an increase in demand for genetic 
insight (Pyeritz, 2011). The net result is a pressure to improve productivity by providing patients with 
more up to date information (Moffatt et al., 2014), and a responsibilisation of the professional who 
is expected to incorporate more complex data management processes as part of good clinical 
practice (Rubinstein, 2008). 
The recontacting discourse also links the productivity of the responsible genetic clinician with the 
somatic individual and the genetically at-risk patient. The development of biological citizenship has 
seeŶ the foƌŵatioŶ of iŶteƌest gƌoups ĐalliŶg atteŶtioŶ to the Ŷeed to ƌeseaƌĐh ͚theiƌ͛ disease, ǁith 
the somatic individual increasingly appropriating complex scientific discourses to manage their 
bodies themselves (Novas & Rose, 2000). In different ways, these movements contribute to the 
development of personalised medicine, within which genomic sciences play a key role. Given their 
interest in acquiring the best available information to manage their own condition, the somatic 
individual might be interested in being recontacted should new information come to light. In 
additioŶ, the ͚geŶetiĐallǇ at ƌisk͛ patieŶt (Bunton & Petersen, 2005; Novas & Rose, 2000) may be 
ƌeĐalled to disĐuss theiƌ ͚susĐeptiďilitǇ͛ to illŶess ǁith a ǀieǁ to sustaiŶiŶg aŶ aĐĐeptaďle leǀel of 
health ;‘ose, ϮϬϬϳͿ. ‘eĐoŶtaĐtiŶg also ƌeĐasts patieŶts as ͚uŶpatieŶts͛ (Oduncu, 2002: 55) or as 
͚patieŶts iŶ ǁaitiŶg͛ (Timmermans & Buchbinder, 2010: 409); no longer entirely healthy, these 
patients live knowing they may be recalled at any time.  
The ƌespoŶsiďilisatioŶ of the geŶetiĐ pƌofessioŶal iŶheƌeŶt iŶ the ͚dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt͛ ;‘uďiŶsteiŶ, 
ϮϬϬϴͿ has the poteŶtial to ƌeŶdeƌ pƌofessioŶals ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ ŵaŶagiŶg theiƌ patieŶt͛s data iŶ 
perpetuity. Any new insight that may be relevant to a patient seen in the past, may raise the 
pƌospeĐt of a suďstaŶtiǀe ͚dutǇ͛ to update, iŶfoƌŵ or warn. In effect, a formalised duty to recontact 
may provide patients, the public and the judiciary with a lever on professional practice in medical 
geŶetiĐs ;Petƌila, ϮϬϬϭͿ. IŶ this seŶse, the fuƌtheƌ elaďoƌatioŶ of a ͚dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt͛ ƌaises ĐoŶĐeƌŶs 
about the professional conduct and professional self-governance in genetics.  
Conceptual framework 
Given that the aim of this paper is to explore how genetics professionals make sense of the duty to 
recontact, we develop a conceptual frame that situates genetic professionals as acting in relation 
both to systems and to lifeworlds. This reflects how genetics professionals engage with a complex 
scientific, professional, and bureaucratic environment and a complex lifeworld environment that 
both they and their patients experience. Responsibility discourses are complicated by elision and 
overlaps with both dimensions, and a theoretical frame is needed to tease apart these intermingled 
aspects. 
The complementary dimensions of discourse identified by Foucault and Habermas also entail 
complementary aspects of responsibility. Foucault (1978) explored discourse as a system, and 
developed an analysis of how discourses allow ideas and practices to extend their reach by 
developing ideas as technologies of power. Whether as technologies of power or governmentality, 
discourse provides a way of responsibilising individuals by encouraging them to inculcate the 
discourse and thereby incorporate the responsibilities articulated by the discourse (see Rose, 1999). 
Exploring the assumptions actors must accept as they try to coordinate activities through 
communication, Habermas (1987) mapped the rational structure of understandings as they relate 
with our deep seated sense of responsibility. The sense that each of us has of ourselves as moral and 
responsible beings, comes to us through our interaction with others and Habermas (1987) reveals 
the rational basis of the connection between this inner worldly sense and the social and cultural 
world. We develop a conceptual frame that incorporates both system and lifeworld elements to 
reflect how clinical genetics professionals (consultants and counsellors) manage relations between 
the medical branch of a scientific discipline and the personal lifeworlds of patients and their families. 
System generated responsibilities  
The connection between discourse and responsibility emerges in Foucault (1978) through the role of 
the state in shaping, legitimating and orienting how power is channelled throughout society, 
inculcating people and professionals to the rationale of the discourse. Following Foucault, Rose 
(1999: 70) develops the idea of responsibilisation as he traces the dispersal of power away from the 
centre of the knowing, planning, and steering state and its return to society; i.e. to businesses, 
organisations, localities, communities, and individuals. This process takes place as part of the 
formation of an intelligent and enabling state, and is based on an inculcation of the private sphere 
with expert rationality. Social actors are both made free and responsible for their own destiny, 
incorporating these actors as custodians of the destiny of society (1999: 175). In any event, 
discourses like social systems provide spaces within which the logic of rationality may unfold, 
revealing the responsibilities of individuals as both professionals and patients.  
Moral and social responsibilities in the lifeworld  
At the centre of the duty to recontact is a relationship between a patient and a professional (Hunter 
et al., 2001, Pyeritz, 2011, Rubinstein, 2008). The normative force binding these two is composed of 
promises, hopes and expectations around diagnoses and disease management. This leads to a 
charged normative dimension which means where each encounter has the potential to raise topics 
of iŶteƌest to the geŶetiĐs ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ oƌ to otheƌ ;oƌ Ŷot Ǉet ďoƌŶͿ ŵeŵďeƌs of the patieŶt͛s faŵilǇ. 
The bond is stabilised using cognitive claims; understandings of genetic/genomic tests, 
interpretations and diagnoses that cover the outlooks of the professional and the patient, allowing 
both to think they understand each other enough to act in relation to each other. To distinguish the 
normative responsibilities involved in a duty to recontact, we use a framework that recognises how 
cognitive constructions shape interaction enabling people to believe they understand situations in 
the same way, even when interpretations diverge.  
Within his action theory, Habermas offers a framework that unpacks the cognitive content of 
normative perspectives by focusing on the rational potential inherent in the lifeworld. Habermas 
;ϭϵϴϳ: ϭϮϲͿ situates the lifeǁoƌld as a ͚tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal site͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh iŶdiǀiduals Đoŵe togetheƌ aŶd 
communicate.1 In this sense, the lifeworld provides a social context free from the recalcitrant 
structures of everyday life but whose rational potential is constitutive of these structures. The 
concept of communicative action allows Habermas to conceptualise how situations can be managed 
cooperatively through communication. For Habermas, two situations (what Habermas refers to as 
worlds) stand out as of primary importance in this situation management – communication to select 
the most appropriate means to achieve an end (teleological rationality), and communication aimed 
at identifying norms that can be accepted by all concerned (communicative reason). A third comes 
up as a kiŶd of ƌesidue of the seĐoŶd ǁoƌld, aŶd iŶǀolǀes the iŶteƌŶal ǁoƌld of aŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛ oǁŶ 
feelings, hopes and experiences. The crucial point is that the lifeworld provides a context in which 
this communicative management of situations takes place (1987: 130-133).  
Haďeƌŵas͛s thƌee ǁoƌlds ;the oďjeĐtiǀe ǁoƌld, soĐial ǁoƌld aŶd iŶteƌŶal oƌ suďjeĐtiǀe ǁoƌldͿ pƌoǀide 
the lifeworld with a rational potential that participants take for granted, while the transcendental 
setting of the lifeworld leaves it in principle open to construction in a potentially infinite variety of 
ways. These worlds provide the rational basis on which participants can believe they are 
coordinating action based on shared assumptions even when individual interpretations of the 
assumptions diverge. Different concepts of responsibility come into view depending on the aspect of 
the world that is being focused on. In the cultural world, duties become important, in the social 
world, obligations; and in the internal world personal responsibility comes to the fore. Finally, 
Habermas uses a sociological theory of discourse which starts with the cognitive resources provided 
by the different aspects of the lifeworld, and explores what happens to these resources when they 
are disrupted, and the role of discourse and communication in repairing and renewing them (1987: 
                                                          
1 Haďeƌŵas͛s ;ϭϵϴϳͿ ĐoŶĐept of the lifeǁoƌld has ďeeŶ takeŶ up aŶd applied iŶ ŵediĐiŶe ŵost ŶotaďlǇ ďǇ 
Mishler (1984). Hoǁeǀeƌ, foƌ us, Mishleƌ͛s use of this fƌaŵeǁoƌk ƌeŵaiŶs too Đlose to Haďeƌŵas ;ϭϵϴϳͿ, iŶ 
particular, to the way Habermas developed interaction between the lifeworld and the system into a theory of 
soĐietǇ. IŶ effeĐt, Mishleƌ aĐĐepted Haďeƌŵas͛ ͚ďoǆeƌ ŵodel͛ of soĐietǇ ;Baxter, 1987). This theoretic 
framework tends to reify both system and lifeworld, but situating the lifeworld in opposition to the system (or 
medicine) and can lead analysts to ignore how clinicians have their own lifeworld experiences which they bring 
to the clinical encounter (see Barry et al., 2001). IŶ this papeƌ, ǁe take up Haďeƌŵas͛ idea of the lifeǁoƌld as a 
product of the communicative potential of language, and use this conception in line with the work of later 
critical theorists who view social systems as the radical extension of this communicative potential (Eder, 2007).  
141-ϭϰϰͿ. BǇ eǆtƌapolatiŶg fƌoŵ Haďeƌŵas͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌk aŶd foĐusiŶg oŶ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ, ǁe ĐaŶ 
provide the following framework (table 1): 
 
Table 1: Responsibility and the lifeworld 
Role of  
communication 
Dimension of  
lifeworld 
Maintaining the 
lifeworld 
Disrupted lifeworld Communicatively 
reproduced lifeworld 
Cultural world Clarifying duties Loss of clarity on 
meaning 
Critique and renewal 
of duties 
Social world  Organising obligations Disintegration of 
solidarity 
Formation of 
consensus on 
obligations 
Internal world Motivating 
responsible behaviour 
Loss of motivation Commitment to and 
learning about, values 
orienting responsible 
behaviour 
 
To summarise, the sense of responsibility is socially and transcendentally located in the shifting 
boundaries of the lifeworld. The meaning of responsibility shifts depending on the aspect of the 
lifeworld that is thematised, corresponding with the different worlds identified in language. Where 
the world of culture, reason or tradition is thematised, the form of responsibility focuses on the roles 
and duties held by different members. When clarity on the duties of participants is disrupted, then 
the meaning and rationality of duties is questioned, leading participants to reflect on their position 
and role in proceedings. Repairing this rationality means critiquing, clarifying and renewing the 
rational basis for the distribution of roles and duties.  
Where the social world of interpersonal relations is concerned, the formality of roles and duties is 
experienced more personally as obligations. The traditions and cultures delineating roles and duties 
at the cultural level shape personal relations based on interpersonal obligations obtaining between 
people. These obligations also take a rational structure insofar as the expectations that each will 
behave according to relevant norms is based on shared background assumptions and projections 
that serve to sustain the social order. When ruptures occur, there transpires a loss of solidarity, 
bringing about reflection on the norms according to which each participant can be expected to act, 
including those co-ordinating action and shared counterfactual norms.  
Where the internal world of the participant is thematised, the sense of responsibility at issue focuses 
on how participants maintain the motivation to connect with their duties and obligations. A 
disruption of the motivation to behave responsibly weakens the motivation to accept personal 
responsibilities. Repairing this sense of responsibility involves reflecting on the norms, values and 
materials engendering commitment to responsible behaviour, and on how individuals internalise 
this motivation through learning processes.  
Bringing these back to recontacting, we can say that patients and professionals can view their 
situation as part of the cultural world, and to think about the reciprocal rights and duties each owe 
to, and can expect of, the other. Viewed as part of the social world, the duty to recontact becomes 
an obligation that flows from social norms which are personally held and communicatively ordered. 
As something that people feel internally, acting on the duty to recontact gives rise to the ĐliŶiĐiaŶ͛s 
sense of themselves as a responsible professional. 
In bringing Foucault and Habermas together to form a nuanced discourse analytic framework, we 
follow the work of some of the third generation of critical theorists who argue that social systems 
extend and expand the rationality of communicative action (see Strydom, 2000).  
Methods 
In this paper, we explore recontacting in medical genetics using data collected as part of an ESRC 
funded research project. We do this using qualitative material gathered through interviews with 
professionals working in, or closely with, three different genetics services in England and Wales. Staff 
core to genetic services along with professionals who order genetic tests as part of their work, and a 
professional who does not order such tests but who may expect to recontact patients (a General 
Practitioner) were interviewed to generate an in depth understanding of professionals' experiences 
of recontacting, and how they understand the duty to recontact. The interviews were conducted 
with clinical genetics staff (clinical geneticists, genetic counsellors and registrars), laboratory 
genetics staff, and other professionals who sometimes order genetic tests. This paper is based on 
interviews with 31 healthcare professionals conducted between October 2016 and January 2018.  
Interviews were recorded, professionally transcribed, and shared among the research team for 
further analysis. The project received full ethical approval. 
This paper draws together a conceptual framework with qualitative interview material to present an 
analysis of the discourses of responsibility used in the context of medical genetics in the UK. This 
ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ ďuilds oŶ the lead authoƌ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe ;DoheŶǇ, ϮϬϬϳͿ of aŶalǇsiŶg ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ 
discourses in a different context. On the one hand, this conceptual framework has been adopted 
because its action theoretic underpinnings makes space for responsibility and is therefore sensitive 
to the discourses at issue here. However, this frame is only indicative of discursive aspects of 
responsibility, and required expansion and refinement to capture the full range of discourses 
observed in the data. Hence, the both the analysis and the frame were iteratively developed and 
refined through the analysis process.  
Systems discourses and the duty to recontact  
Governing recontact 
As we have already noted, recontacting is enacted in an ad hoc way by different genetic services, 
and is seen as ethically desirable but practically difficult. As part of our interviews with professionals, 
we asked about policy guidance. Responses provide insight on the shape of guidance sought by 
professionals, and how professionals felt they would like recontact to be governed.  
The interviewees preferred guidelines or aids that orient professionals on recontacting over directive 
policies that might standardise practice across the country. A number of interviewees described the 
potential usefulness of policies that shaped professional judgement. As the duty to recontact creates 
expectations that burden professionals with making decisions themselves, this burden leaves them 
with a desire for some direction: 
[…] But I think, particularly consultants can feel quite vulnerable sometimes, […] 
they have to make a call on these things in the absence of clear guidelines and 
that’s a lot of responsibility. And I think there is not… there’s not really any 
guidance. A guideline is a guide, it’s not the same as having an absolute ruling, you 
are allowed to interpret, you are allowed to use your clinical judgement and I think 
generally it’s really helpful. (P13) 
Always the problems I have with policies is that some people follow them too 
rigidly, […] um but that’s why I’m a consultant, as a consultant I have the ability to 
overrule and step aside.  But as a guideline for other people who may be finding it 
more difficult to make a decision then I think it’s good to have a policy, so they 
know where your fall-back position is already a default. (P5) 
The question of whether or how to recontact a patient raises the need for an analysis of the new 
information and the situation of the patient. For these professionals, making a decision may be 
aided by the existence of policy guidelines, but it was important that these remain guides and not 
commands. These interviewees saw guides as aids that provide a consultant with a kind of 
conversation partner they can engage with as they deliberate a situation, aiding consultants in the 
exercise of their own judgement. As a guide, this projected conversation partner would provide all 
consultants with the same communication partner that they could each address individually as they 
made their decision: 
[…] So I think a guideline may be helpful, it can be adopted or amended as fit 
according to the circumstances and it would probably allow a bit more 
standardisation across the whole country, so stop this sort of postcode lottery 
where some services are doing lots of recontact and others aren’t. (P18) 
If all professionals addressed the same guidelines, these guides would direct each in the same way, 
reducing inconsistency and allowing standardisation.  
 
Some interviewees described what they felt might be articulated in guides:  
[…] it could be as simple as this you know, ‘if there are significant health 
implications for new information’, so that might be surveillance it might be a new 
gene test, new gene available, anyway, new information because that’s all we’re 
really talking about. ‘If there are sufficient health implications arising from new 
information it is the genetics department responsibility to contact patients they 
know about, are at risk or would benefit from that information’. I think that as a 
bland general statement err, that should be made and I don’t think it is at the 
moment. (P5) 
The statement that a guideline might provide to professionals could, according to P5, assert that 
there is a duty, the situation in which the duty appears, and what the duty stipulates. This is 
interesting because while it dispels doubt, it connects with a perception that some clinicians are 
unsure of how or why a duty might arise. On the one hand, the policy operates as an idealised 
communication partner that articulates where and how a duty arises, shaping the space in which the 
professional considers their options. In articulating this duty, the policy provides the genetics service 
with grounds to argue for the resources with which to actualise the duty since placing this duty on 
professionals would enable them to make a case to commissioners for improvements to data 
management to enable professionals to enact this responsibility: 
[…] if there are guidelines say from NICE that say, ‘You have a duty to recontact in 
these scenarios,’ then we have the ability to go to commissioners, I guess, and 
say, ‘We need funding to put this IT system in place, because if we don’t… if we 
don’t have that…’ If we just say, ‘Well we think it’s really important,’ I don’t think 
we’d get the support. (P13) 
For these interviewees, guidelines needed to remain open to the near infinite range of potential new 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ giǀiŶg ƌise to the Ŷeed to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt ;͞The difficulty with genetics is that there are so 
many exceptions and so many special circumstances […] the circumstances can be so variable͟ (P5)) 
that a policy guide would need to remain neutral on the circumstances giving rise to a question 
about recontacting. However, guidelines could provide some direction on the process of managing a 
recontact. First of all, structuring the process of informing patients that they may be recontacted by 
simply informing patients from the beginning of their consultation that they may be recontacted. 
Second, setting out how to manage the intermediate steps between the genetics department and 
the patieŶt ;͞it͛s goiŶg to ŵake it ŵoƌe ĐoŶfusiŶg if ǁe get iŶ touĐh ǁith the CliŶiĐiaŶ aŶd the 
CliŶiĐiaŶ gets iŶ touĐh ǁith the patieŶt, Ǉou͛ƌe addiŶg ŵoƌe steps iŶ aŶd ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ͟ ;PϭͿͿ. Thiƌd, 
standardising recontact could serve to standardise service across the country: 
[…] because we are a discipline that deals with family and so we cover people in 
lots of different regions often and […] It’s bad enough when you have to say, ‘Well, 
you are getting breast screening at these intervals but your cousin is in x district so 
she’ll get it more often.’ That’s difficult enough. But saying, ‘Well over here we 
think your gene change is pathogenic and over there we are ignoring it,’ I mean, 
that I think is very damaging to patient trust. (P13) 
Standardising the situations in which a patient may be recontacted could, therefore, help 
standardise service provision across the country.  
 
Guidance, legal interventions, and the limits of policy 
Some interviewees expressed concern on the relationship between a recontacting policy and where 
and how such a duty might be defined in law. Some interviewees felt that either legal requirements 
already existed, or may not be unreasonable: 
[…] Medical profession would always agree, there should be recall, re-contact 
system.  I mean … American system, you know, it works very much, you know.  
The clinician is sitting under … a sword hanging over the head situation.  They 
cannot think of delaying even for a week or so if they came to know something 
that would help their patient. They would [recontact]. (P3) 
[…] I mean I think it wouldn’t be unreasonable for like severe cases like the 
Huntington’s disease example that we talked about, that there was a legal 
responsibility to get back in touch with people. (P23) 
This was tempered with a concern that a legal duty may attract legal sanctions which would mean 
͞tƌǇiŶg people ǁho doŶ͛t ĐoŵplǇ, aŶd giǀiŶg out a puŶishŵeŶt, aŶd that just [feels uŶĐoŵfoƌtaďle]͟ 
(P27). For others, some discomfort was something of aŶ aĐĐeptaďle iƌƌitaŶt ;͞But I͛ŵ heƌe to help 
patients not to try to protect myself from litigation͟ ;PϱͿͿ. Moƌeoǀeƌ, legal Ŷoƌŵs ŵaǇ ďe 
incompatible with professional duties or the administrative management of recontact:  
[…] If a patient has made an active decision not to be re-contacted, then you could 
turn around to them and say you respect that position and you could even have a 
policy on that, so your policy might be you don’t stick your neck out even if you 
think it’s really, really important. Actually, you don’t do that, and if your lawyers 
defend you on that then, legally, you’re protected. (P5) 
The court can’t regulate something unless there’s a process for it to regulate. […] 
But as things stand, when it’s piecemeal and you may or may not be able to find 
the information that you need and you may or may not be able to contact those 
other people, then I think it’s a little bit unfair to make you, legally… [laughs] (P19) 
In effect, these interviewees felt that a duty to recontact could be enforced through the law in 
certain cases, and was more stringently defined in the US jurisdiction for medicine in general. 
However, the duty to recontact involves an encroachment of the law onto professional judgement, 
raising the prospect of professionals receiving legal sanction for having made sound professional 
judgements. In this sense, policies could be formulated that protected professionals from legal 
sanction but at the cost of the loss of their ability to exercise such judgement.  
 
Responsibilising the patient 
A third form of systems discourse emerged with how professionals passed on some of the 
responsibilities of recontacting to patients. One element of recontacting involves professionals 
keeping abreast of developments in genomic medicine that might have an impact on the health of 
their patients. But this activity can be transferred from the clinician to the patient. The professionals 
described situations where they transferred responsibility for reviewing information, or initiating a 
review of a case, to the patient. Their main method was to frame the situation to encourage the 
patient to get back in touch with the service.  
A number of interviewees recommended that their patients recontact them in three to five years: 
Yeah I ŵeaŶ I just saǇ ... so I͛d saǇ Ǉou kŶoǁ ͞ǁe fouŶd this geŶetiĐ ǀaƌiaŶt eƌŵ it ŵight ďe 
liŶked to Ǉouƌ ĐoŶditioŶ, it ŵight Ŷot, ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ͟. […] it͛s just I haǀe to saǇ ͞ǁe ĐaŶ͛t do 
anything else now erm we might have more information in the future. Get back in touch with 
us iŶ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe͟. AŶd it͛s ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh, Ǉeah, leaǀiŶg the ďall iŶ theiƌ Đouƌt aŶd I doŶ͛t … I 
doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if theǇ ǁill Đoŵe ďaĐk oƌ Ŷot ƌeallǇ. ;PϵͿ 
Clearly, this interviewee was uncomfortable with this transfer of responsibility but this appeared to 
be the only option. Responsibilising the patient involved transferring both the personal and the 
cognitive burdens of renewing a search from the professional to the patient. Patients have their own 
drives and interests which animate their desire to review their case. By transferring responsibility to 
the patient, the professional asks the patient to consider these motivations: 
… I ŵeaŶ, the eǆaŵple I haǀe iŶ ŵiŶd is that theǇ saǇ, ͚Yes, ǁe͛ll ĐoŶtaĐt iŶ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe.͛ I 
ŵeaŶ, ǁho kŶoǁs ǁhetheƌ theǇ ǁill do, […] But theǇ did seeŵ iŶteƌested ŵaǇďe ďeĐause of 
the other family members more than themselves, because if they are affected they know that 
they are going to see a specialist, but what about siblings or parents? So they are, yes, I think 
they are willing to. (P16) 
I ǁill Ƌuite ofteŶ saǇ ͞if Ǉou aƌe still iŶteƌested Ǉou kŶoǁ, if Ǉou phoŶe ŵe iŶ thƌee oƌ fiǀe 
years to see if theƌe͛s aŶǇthiŶg Ŷeǁ goiŶg oŶ͟ ;P25). 
The transfer of responsibility takes place in the context of rapidly moving testing technologies, 
where there is uncertainty about when an appropriate test might become available:  
Foƌ eǆaŵple, foƌ ĐaƌdioŵǇopathǇ, […] so if I͛ǀe ǁithheld a geŶe test oƌ I kŶoǁ that geŶe 
testing is adǀaŶĐiŶg so ƋuiĐklǇ that theƌe ŵaǇ ďe Ŷeǁ thiŶgs ƌouŶd the ĐoƌŶeƌ aŶd it͛s Ŷegatiǀe 
on this occasion, I would ask them to contact me again. If there was a change in the family 
circumstances, any way, around five years often, or three to five years depending on the 
ĐoŶditioŶ. […] ;PϭϴͿ 
On the other hand, by responsibilising the patient, the professional sometimes transfers a 
responsibility to an individual who has little appreciation of the potential gravity of this task: 
… so I think people are often quite trusting of medical staff and think that if they had a risk of 
breast cancer or something somebody would tell them. And what I find difficult is that 
sometimes we put that burden of responsibility on the patient and I, a, doŶ͛t thiŶk the patieŶt 
entirely realises that that͛s ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk that͛s ƌeallǇ ǁhat DoĐtoƌs do. 
Like we usually have ownership over our patients and look after them, do you know what I 
ŵeaŶ … so if theƌe͛s soŵethiŶg that Đould ďe daŶ, eƌ, Ǉou kŶoǁ a daŶgeƌ to theŵ I think 
people do assume that somebody will come and tell them. (P33) 
Equally, the patient may find this responsibility a great burden. Thus, the following laboratory 
geneticist described a worry that patients would look for information on variants for which there is 
very little data: 
[…] what I worry about slightly is people then assuming a diagnosis or doing too much 
Googling et Đeteƌa, espeĐiallǇ ǁheƌe it͛s a ƌeseaƌĐh ǀaƌiaŶt, aŶd iŶ theoƌǇ ǁe haǀeŶ͛t tested oŶ 
the NHS [where testing has been funded through a research project]. AŶd I͛ŵ alǁaǇs Ƌuite 
keen to state this is a research finding, it has to be tested through a proper accredited lab and 
ďǇ defiŶitioŶ at that stage ǁe haǀeŶ͛t doŶe that, […] ;PϯϬͿ 
Transferring responsibility for recontacting to the patient, therefore, involved some discomfort for 
clinicians as they could not be sure how the patient would manage this responsibility. Patients could 
get back to the genetics service if they were interested in having an update, or forget about the test. 
There remained a concern that patients would either not appreciate the gravity of the potential 
information, would not interpret changes in family circumstances as potentially relevant 
information, or would obsess over the information.  
Lifeworld discourses and the duty to recontact 
Recontact and duty discourses 
The duty discourse focuses on an agreement forged between the clinician and the patient. This 
discourse draws on assumptions situating both participants as rational adults, who come together 
and form a contract. Thus, participants are free in the liberal sense, that is, they have reflected on 
their own interests, and have decided to follow what they see as the best course of action. The 
patient contracts the professional to identify the molecular cause of an illness, and then to keep 
abreast of developments pertinent to the condition. The professional accepts this commission, and 
provides a service aimed at identifying a diagnosis and contributing towards the management of the 
condition. In effect, once the participants have forged a contract, the patient has a right to expect a 
service, and the professional has a duty to provide this service. Only two interviewees drew 
principally on this discourse: 
Well, I think you are in a form of contract with patients, so patients come to see you and 
establish a contract and which you are going to perform certain parts of that contract and that 
contract is to investigate them and to notify them of that investigation. Now, if they 
speĐifiĐallǇ iŶdiĐate that theǇ doŶ͛t want you to fulfil part of that contract, then you are 
obliged to respect those wishes unless there is major risk involved and then you have to re-
evaluate that, and I think that that contract does not terminate when you have finished the 
consultation and say ͚ǁe haǀeŶ͛t fouŶd aŶǇthiŶg͛. I think your contract is still live and that the 
patient has still made that request. (RHCP4G) 
Within this discourse, the bond between the clinician and the patient was focused on the effort to 
secure a genetic diagnosis. By agreeing to seek out a genetic diagnosis for a patient, the clinician 
assimilated a duty and the patient acquired a right to expect the clinician to fulfil this duty. 
IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, this dutǇ disĐouƌse has Ŷo tiŵe liŵit. It foĐuses oŶ the aĐtiǀitǇ of ͚iŶǀestigatiŶg͛ the 
patieŶt͛s geŶetiĐ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ to ƌeǀeal a geŶetiĐ diagŶosis ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ iŶǀolǀe soŵehoǁ keepiŶg 
abreast of developments relevant to the case (either in terms of diagnosis, management or 
treatment). Because the clinical geneticist performs her duty by searching for a diagnosis, this 
clinician can only be understood as fulfilling her duty when a satisfactory genetic diagnosis is 
achieved.  
The trouble with this view is that it loads the professional with a more formal expectation than may 
reasonably be expected. The reality is that the clinician is also an individual with their own personal 
and career history, working within a clinical system whose commissioning arrangements have not 
supported the service reconsidering past cases, using somewhat dated data management systems. 
However, the trouble for clinicians was that the doctor patient relationship within such a specialised 
area increased their sense of duty: 
Eƌŵ, I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe geŶetiĐ DoĐtoƌs … aŶd ǁe͛ǀe got a ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to ouƌ patieŶts […] I kŶoǁ 
that͛s Ŷot easǇ, ďut I, ǁe pƌoďaďlǇ adǀoĐate that ǁe should all haǀe a soƌt of oŶgoiŶg list of 
ouƌ patieŶts aŶd eǀeƌǇ so ofteŶ ƌeǀieǁ that aŶd ĐheĐk oŶ ǁhat, just ďeĐause I thiŶk that͛s Ǉou 
kŶoǁ. […] if ǁe ďƌiŶg it [the patieŶt file] out aŶd do a quick literature search and say right 
soŵethiŶg has ĐhaŶged theŶ ǁe do Ŷeed to ďƌiŶg theŵ ďaĐk aŶd I thiŶk if it͛s iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
aďout a geŶetiĐ ƌesult … ǁho else͛s ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ is it otheƌ thaŶ ouƌs? “o that͛s soƌt of the 
whole purpose of the speciality I would say. (P33) 
Thus, whereas RHCP4G begins with a formalised duty, P33 arrives at an inescapable conclusion that 
the expectation of the speciality is that they recontact when appropriate.  
 
Because this duty rests on the bond created by the activity of identifying and managing a genetic 
diagnosis, then the duty discourse appears whenever relevant new information is found. While 
ŵaŶǇ iŶteƌǀieǁees dƌeǁ ŵoƌe oŶ the ͚oďligatioŶ͛ disĐouƌse detailed ďeloǁ, theǇ also dƌeǁ oŶ the 
͚dutǇ͛ disĐouƌse ǁheƌe Ŷeǁ information relevant for a patient came to light. For example, the 
sudden appearance of new information relevant to identified case(s) brings the duty discourse into 
view:  
Yeah, yeah, I usually leave it to them, because, and I have not actively made an effort over the 
past year looking at all of the VUS, looking at literature to see whether there's any new paper 
published. I haven't done that […] but I think you know erm if there were something which 
came up in the interim, which is quite obvious right in front of me and it comes, and even 
though I have not put in the letter that I will contact you if there's any new information, I 
would write to them, to say ͞I've met you before, you know this is something that has recently 
come to my attention about this particular gene, do you want to come and discuss͟. (P6) 
CleaƌlǇ, the appeaƌaŶĐe of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ peƌtiŶeŶt to a patieŶt͛s ĐoŶditioŶ ďefoƌe a pƌofessioŶal ďƌiŶgs 
a legitimate expectation that the professional recontact the patient. That is, a duty for the 
professional to recontact a patient accompanies the appearance of relevant information.  
 
Recontact and obligation discourses 
The second view holds that there is a duty to the patient, but this is a duty held by the relevant 
clinician. In this discourse, the expectation is that the clinician bears the patient in mind when they 
Đoŵe upoŶ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that ŵight ďe ƌeleǀaŶt to the patieŶt͛s ĐoŶditioŶ. This is a ǁeakeƌ 
expectation than found in the duty discourse, and limits expectations to those that can reasonably 
be made of individual professionals:  
Yeah, ǁell eǆaĐtlǇ, I thiŶk Ǉou͛d feel ŵoƌe ƌespoŶsiďle if Ǉou saǁ, oh ͚I saw someone last year͛ 
and that seems quite recently, I should do that. And then you think you know ͚I only saw you 
last Ǉeaƌ aŶd Ǉou didŶ͛t tell me about this͛, ǁheƌeas if Ǉou͛d seeŶ theŵ teŶ Ǉeaƌs ďefoƌe theǇ 
pƌoďaďlǇ ǁouldŶ͛t eǆpeĐt Ǉou to ƌeŵeŵďeƌ theŵ.  AŶd pƌoďaďlǇ ǁouldŶ͛t.  I ŵeaŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ 
cases wheƌe Ǉou͛ǀe had a lot to do ǁith, theǇ ŵight eǆpeĐt aŶd Ǉou ŵight eǆpeĐt ŵoƌe, ďut 
the average patient is probably, tiŵe is pƌoďaďlǇ a ďit ƌeleǀaŶt.  “o I doŶ͛t thiŶk, Ŷot legallǇ, 
but logistically. (P25) 
This discourse still draws on a conception of duty. The clinician has accepted a mandate to keep 
abreast of information relevant to the condition. But here, the bond is not a formal one in which the 
clinician continues to be bound by the original duty to that particular patient. The bond is 
conditional on the capacities and capabilities of the clinician to manage information, bear details of 
particular patients in mind, and correlate information with individual cases. This weakens the 
normative force of the bond between the professional and patient. Rather than binding these two 
using the expectation that a formal duty remains relevant in the same way as it was initiated, the 
bond transmutes to something more like an obligation in which the reasonable expectations that 
can be made of the people involved become relevant. In a sense, the obligation discourse highlights 
the work and commitment underscoring the duty discourse.  
 
The obligation discourse was principally drawn upon to emphasise the changing position of the 
clinician in the clinician-patient relationship. Not only was the passing of time causing memory of the 
patient to fade, but information about the presentation of genetic conditions can change 
complicating the process of reviewing past records in light of current knowledge: 
Clinician: But it [a database] still ǁoŶ͛t do ǁhat I ǁaŶt, ǁhiĐh is, ͞Please giǀe ŵe a list of 
patients with left ďig toe sǇŶdƌoŵe͟.  AŶd doŶ͛t foƌget, ǁheŶ Ǉou get a ďƌaŶd Ŷeǁ, saǇ, 
͚mutation͛ as it says there, it may be a very muddy sort of phenotype.  You know, like boys 
ǁith ŵeŶtal ƌetaƌdatioŶ … ǁho͛ǀe got sŵall eaƌs aŶd ďig testiĐles … have this gene.  Now, how 
am I going to pull back boys with mental retardation, small heads and big testicles?  There is 
never going to be a database with that on it, is there? 
Interviewer: No.  No. 
Clinician: You kŶoǁ, all I ĐaŶ do is thiŶk aďout all the patieŶts I͛ǀe seeŶ and try and think, now, 
did anybody fit that pattern? (P7) 
The problems here range from the terms used to describe and record features and the extent to 
which these correspond with the terms used in current discussions, through to situations where 
features that were not seen as relevant and in need of recording in the past, turn out to be relevant 
in contemporary reviews. Thus, individual selection of cases, the data recorded on cases and the 
terms used to record data can all shape the situation in which a decision about recontacting a case 
may be made. So, it is not just the capriciousness of human capacities that attenuates duty to 
obligation, but also professional norms and practices. 
 
Recontact and the responsibility discourse 
The sense of duty also involves the exercise of a moral sensibility. Whereas duty arises from 
expectations that bind self and other, the personal sense of responsibility arises as a pre-theoretic, 
pre-ontological commitment to do the right thing for a person who calls for help. Moreover, while 
duty involves some readily identifiable action, no such luxury is afforded the responsible person. 
Bauman (1993) talks of the importance of the moral caress to underline the uncertainty and fragility 
of the ǁilliŶgŶess ͚to ďe foƌ the otheƌ͛. 
Paying attention to the needs of the other without quite knowing what to do presents challenges for 
clinicians. Such challenges became particularly evident where the clinician seeks to balance the 
patieŶt͛s ƌight Ŷot to kŶoǁ theiƌ geŶetiĐ status agaiŶst the potential value of this information for the 
patient or their family: 
They could put it [a letter], bin it and it may be that. You'll have discussed with the 
consultant or your colleague and you say “actually I'll drop them one more letter 
and say ‘if we don't hear from you we'll understand we don’t want to get in touch’” 
and perhaps copy that to the GP. Because at least then there's someone else there 
that knows. You know. Erm, it may be that for sudden cardiac death or something, 
or for something where there can be a surveillance that you write a stronger letter. 
(P34) 
No, if a patient has clearly stated, is informed and has clearly stated they don’t 
want to be contacted about something, it’s like when our patients decline 
treatment, if they’re informed and they’ve made that decision that … they’ve 
declined it then they’ve declined it, that’s their right. (P1) 
[…] because I think sometimes what people decide at one time changes. But the 
difficulty is you don’t know that, and it may be just that they were really struggling 
at that that time.  […]  It would be helpful if the notes are a bit more extensive and 
say why they don’t want to be re-contacted. […] (P24) 
The professionals found that initiating a communication with a patient who may not want to receive 
this communication unsettling. Not hearing back from patients left the P34 with a feeling that 
perhaps they had not been clear enough about the gravity of the situation, but trying to balance this 
ǁith a ƌespeĐt foƌ the patieŶt͛s ƌight Ŷot to kŶoǁ. Pϭ ǁas ŵoƌe ǁilliŶg to ƌespeĐt a patieŶt͛s ƌight Ŷot 
to know, and P24 feels patients may ask not to be recontacted at a time when they are 
overwhelmed by the situation, and this feeling aŶd theiƌ deĐisioŶ ŵaǇ ĐhaŶge. “o ǁheƌe the ͚dutǇ͛ to 
recontact applies, the professional finds themselves trying to interpret the meaning of their 
responsibility to respect the autonomy of the patient.  
 
Once the clinician has decided that there is a duty to recontact a patient, they need to decide how 
best to exercise this duty. This means paying attention to the patient as a person. Carrying out this 
duty involved gathering insight on the patient to enable the clinician to judge the meaning of 
responsible conduct in this situation: 
It depeŶds.  I͛ll go thƌough the Ŷotes aŶd ŵǇ letteƌs fiƌst, to see hoǁ I͛ǀe ĐoŶtaĐted theŵ iŶ 
the past, ďeĐause usuallǇ theƌe͛s soŵe ƌeĐoƌd of hoǁ theǇ͛d like to ďe ĐoŶtaĐted.  If I͛ǀe 
alƌeadǇ doŶe testiŶg theƌe͛ll ďe soŵe ƌecord of how they wanted to be contacted with that 
ƌesult.  “o that ǁill giǀe ŵe a Đlue.  […]  AŶd usuallǇ it ǁould ďe ďǇ letteƌ oƌ phoŶe. ;PϮϰͿ 
Yes. So if I know them myself, and it had been fairly recently like within the last five years, 
easily be in my memory, I would probably write to them myself. But if I have had no contact or 
it͛s ďeeŶ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs oƌ theǇ ǁeƌe a family that were seen by my registrar many years ago and 
I never saw them, I would try and go through their physician, be it their hospital practitioner 
oƌ theiƌ GP […] ;PϭϴͿ 
The modality of the recontact was based on an appreciation of the patient, and their potential 
receptivity to the new information. Interviewees described various ways in which they carried out 
their duty to recontact in a responsible manner. One interviewee described using memory jogs in 
notes to help her remember patients so that she could adjust her recontact. Another described using 
letteƌs as a ǁaǇ of eŶsuƌiŶg patieŶts haǀe tiŵe to thiŶk so that ͞they may have prepared themselves, 
even only if it's a little bit psǇĐhologiĐallǇ, to fiŶd out͟ (P8).  
Conclusions 
This article applied a critical theoretic frame to qualitative data gathered through interviews with 
people working in or around genetic services, to explore the complexity of the duty to recontact. 
Specifically, we show that recontacting in medical genetics involves layers of ideas and concepts. 
First, there is a clear desire for policy guidance on the part of the professionals as a way of 
standardising processes, and orienting professional practice. This involves a willingness to accept 
some governance on recontacting, and to act in accordance with the steer that might be provided by 
guidance even if this might mean risking legal sanction. Through the concept of responsibilisation, 
we show that recontacting reaches through to the experiences of patients who are already being 
asked to manage the recontact process.  
Recontacting is not just a systems matter, but also encompasses the lifeworld experiences of the 
professionals, patients and their families. In this dimension, some professionals draw on a duty 
discourse to understand their connection with the patient as a form of contract. Using this duty 
discourse, the professional accepts a duty to keep abreast of developŵeŶts peƌtiŶeŶt to a patieŶt͛s 
condition, enabling the patient to expect this of the professional. This rationale seems sensible when 
the complexity of genetics and genomic research is taken into account, and the expertise needed to 
comprehend whether or how developments may be relevant. Next, a discourse emerges which 
recognises that professionals have a duty to patients, but pragmatises this duty in light of the 
limitations of the professional involved. This discourse situates the professional as a human, with all 
the frailties and limitations of any other human, and weakens the duty to recontact to the social 
obligations we each can expect of each other. On this discourse, the professional is obliged to keep 
the patient in mind when they come upon new developments, but only to the extent that they can 
reasonably be expected to recall the details of any particular case. A professional might simply 
forget, retire, or move, undermining a contractual duty to recontact while the commitments 
underpinning duties can easily fade and give way to discourse of obligation to emerge. This 
discourse also recognises the difficulties genetic services face in incorporating the duty to recontact, 
and how the exercise of this duty rests on the shoulders of individual professionals. Finally, 
recontacting raises complex issues for professionals, stimulating a discourse on their responsibilities 
to their patients. Trying to do their best for individual patients, who may not wish to think about a 
traumatic experience they had in the past, or who have indicated they would prefer not to hear from 
the genetics service, professionals drew on a discourse of personal responsibility. The professionals 
interviewed varied in their willingness to engage in this discourse. Some preferred to recontact in 
eǀeƌǇ ƌeleǀaŶt Đase; soŵe felt theiƌ dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶtaĐt Đould oǀeƌƌide the patieŶt͛s ƌight Ŷot to kŶoǁ; 
others thought through each case individually. Thus, not only was there a policy discourse taking 
place at a systems level, but interviewees drew on sets of ideas that can be distinguished in terms of 
their duties in a cultural world, their obligations as members of a social world, and their 
responsibilities as individual professionals striving to do their best for their patients.  
Recontacting, theƌefoƌe, is Ŷot a siŶgulaƌ ͚dutǇ͛, ďut a Đoŵpleǆ iŶteƌplaǇ of shiftiŶg disĐouƌses of 
responsibilities. Given this complexity, stabilising a duty to recontact requires a policy environment 
that helps both professionals and patients understand what is expected of them while fostering the 
commitment of professionals to their patients. The development of a prescriptive policy determining 
recontact may connect easily with a formal sense of professional duty, but also shoulders 
professionals with specific and potentially onerous duties. However, the complex nature of genetics 
means that such a policy might be of little use in practice. Adopting a guidance framework that is 
less prescriptive may recognise how recontact is conducted by individual professionals, and is 
subject to their idiosyncratic and human shortcomings. Either framework will shape how 
professionals feel towards their patients, moulding the sense of responsibility in ways that might 
foster or undermine the commitment of professionals.  
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